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The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen 1988) proposes that to predict behavior
four variables should be considered: attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral
control (PBC), and intentions. The present study sought to strengthen the normative
component of the theory of planned behavior (i.e., subjective norms) by replacing the
construct of subjective norms with the notion of normative judgments. The term
normative judgment refers to a class ofjudgments abstracted from four types of norms
represented by four influential theories of norms: personal norms (Schwartz & Fleishman,
1978), descriptive and injunctive norms (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990), and habits
(Oueleette, 1998). From these theories, four types of normative judgments emerged: (a)
morality or the degree to which people judge their own performance of certain behaviors
to be moral, (b) permissibility or the extent to which people judge given actions as
something they are allowed to do, (c) commonality or how common they consider
enactment of particular behaviors, and (d) normality or the degree to which people judge
certain behaviors to be actions that are normal for them to carry out. Placed inside the
framework of the theory of planned behavior, each type of normative judgment by itself
V
was expected to best predict one out of four corresponding classes of behavior influenced
by a particular type of norm. For each theory of norms, participants identified two
behaviors under its influence. Then, they rated these behaviors on each of the four
normative judgments. Resuhs indicated that judgments of normality conceptually
duplicated intentions, veiling the effects of the remaining normative judgments. When
normality judgments were excluded from the hierarchical regression analyses, the study
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CHAPTER I
STRENGTHENING THE NORMATIVE COMPONENT
OF THE THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR
THROUGH NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS
A. Introduction
Social psychology has long been interested in social influence, an area that seems
to encompass a variety of intensively studied topics including attitude change,
conformity, and group dynamics. Of all of the social influence phenomena of interest,
social norms stand out as the best known but, paradoxically, least understood concept.
Norms will, however, not be treated in the traditional way, as external phenomena that
compel people to behave in certain ways, but rather as internal states that impel people to
carry out certain actions. The focus will be not on norms as social influences exerted from
without, but as personal judgments freely made from within. Thus, the relationship
between norms and behavior will be presented not as the immediate influence of societal
or cultural pressures on people's actions, but as the result of simple judgments people
make in their everyday life. To be more specific, norms will be viewed as just one more
type of disposition, as tendencies or inclinations to judge an action in a particular way.
Because its central theme is the notion of norms, this document limits its scope to
those personal judgments people use to describe behavior normatively. These judgments
will understandably go by the name of normative judgments. Focusing on normative
judgments, the objective of the present research is threefold. First, it seeks to extrapolate
from four theories found in the norm literature
—
personal, injunctive, descriptive, and
habitual norm theories—four corresponding normative judgments: morality.
permissibility, commonality, and normality. Second, with the help of the theory of
plamied behavior, it aims at demonstrating that each of the four normative judgments
predicts certain behaviors but not others. Third, through achieving this second goal, it
expects to strengthen the predictive power and accuracy of the normative component of
the theory of planned behavior.
B. Extrapolating Normative Jud^ment^;
Upon reviewing the norm literature in social psychology, four main theories stand
out as representing different ways of understanding the relationship between norms and
behavior. For instance, descriptive norms deal with the relationship between interpersonal
perceptions and norms. This type of norm refers to people's perception of what most
people do (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren; 1990). At the same time, each of the norm
theories suggests certain types ofjudgments people make in their everyday affairs. For
example, perception of what most people do (descriptive norms) is a judgment (See
Figure 1). Thus, in an indirect way, descriptive norms also refer to people's knowledge of
what is commonly and widely done. This knowledge is summarized by and condensed
into a simple word people use to judge their own actions, as well as those of others. In the
case of descriptive norms, people judge actions as being either common or uncommon.
Therefore, the first normative judgment discussed in this paper goes by the name of
normative judgment of commonality, and it indicates to a person that the action he or she
is about to perform is a common one.
Injunctive norms theory is also in the tradition of interpersonal perception
approaches to norms. It states that an injunctive norm is a person's perception of what
most people approve (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno; 1991). Thus, injunctive norms equate
to judgments of what most people approve. As in the case of descriptive norms, certain
words carry the meaning of these judgments, and, therefore, contain one more piece of
norm knowledge in the form of a summary label. These observations lead to a second
class of normative judgments people make: normative judgments of permissibility. They
refer to what people allow, permit, or consent themselves to do. They, too, let a person
know the meaning of the behavior he or she is about to perform. Normative judgments of
permissibility tell people that the behavior they are about to perform is OK to do.
A third theory found in the norm literature is personal norms (Schwartz, 1977).
Briefly put, personal norms refer to people's perception of feeling a personal moral
obligation to perform an action. This feeling of moral obligation stem from networks of
internalized specific values and norms. As such, personal norms deal with another aspect
of norms, namely, the specific rules and regulations guiding everyday behavior. The third
type of normative judgments to be discussed in this document share in common with
personal norms the notion of morality. While personal norms involve moral obligation,
normative judgment of morality refers to moral knowledge. As with all other normative
judgments, the meaning of this type ofjudgment is conveyed by a particular word,
namely, the adjective moral/immoral. This simple label acts as a signal flag indicating to
its carrier that the action he or she is about to perform is a moral one.
Some issues related to the last type of norm considered in this study, habitual
norm, makes it difficult to extrapolate a fourth type of normative judgment. As a starting
difficulty, there exist in the norm literature numerous conceptualizations of habits. At
least four prominent definitions of habit exist. As early as 1872, but certainly earlier than
that, habits represented an internal physiological state residing in networks of affector-
effector nerve fibers and preparing the organism for action execution (Darwin, 1872;
Hull, 1943). According to this account, habits are nothing more than activation potentials
that exist in the nervous system, that external events trigger, and that precede and
motivate behavior. These activation potentials result from repetition of behavior.
Most current theories of habits closely followed the preceding accounts; however,
they shifted the location of the activation potentials from a concrete (i.e., nervous system)
to an abstract mental space (i.e., the mind) (Ouellette, & Wood; 1998). In line with past
accounts, repeated performance of behavior results in the formation of habits or
behavioral tendencies. Responsible for these behavioral dispositions are not physiological
activation potentials housed in the nervous system, but mental representations of
movement initiation, implementation, and termination stored in memory. Unchanging
contexts that provide stable cues activate these unconscious mental representations
which, in turn, manifest themselves as automatic behaviors. Habits stand for the last
aspect of norms often examine in the literature, namely, unconscious processes.
Unfortunately, upon close examination, the preceding two theories of habit hardly
lend themselves to a normative analysis, partly due to their focus on cognitive or
physiological processes outside of awareness. My view on this issue is that researches, in
their identification and examination of habits, should not make consciousness the focus of
attention. To say that something was done out of habit is not to say that it was done
unconsciously, but that it was done because of repeated practice or experience. The
notion of consciousness is a separate issue to be dealt with elsewhere when examining
habits.
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A second problem in attempting to extrapolate a fourth normative judgment is that
it seems inappropriate to include the notion of habits as a central idea found in the norm
literature, and yet, it appears irresistible not to think of norms when the habit construct
makes its appearance. This natural tendency for habits to invoke norms is not an arbitrary
one, for the term inevitably suggests repeated practices (i.e., customs and traditions) that
ultimately result in established patterns of behavior. If habits seem inappropriate given
the context of the present study, it is only because they do not conform to the traditional
way of thinking of norms as external sources of social influence. However, upon taking a
closer look, it becomes apparent that habits are indeed the best evidence of the existence
and operation of as well as the effects of norms on people's behavior.
One of the characteristics of habitual behavior is that it is frequently repeated and
difficult not to do. However, a motive for repetition is needed in order to explain people
carrying out the same behavior multiple times. Norms and many other reasons exist for
people repeating the same behavior. Perhaps they obtain pleasure from carrying it out or
are afraid of social punishment for not performing it. Maybe it is required of them at their
jobs or has become part of a hobby. Whatever the reason might be for someone
performing the same behavior lots of times, the effects will be similar: the behavior will
gradually be easier and easier to carry out and harder and harder to stop doing. A
behavior that is easy to do is a one that has little room for extra learning and requires little
of cognitive resources. One word encapsulates the meaning of a behavior that exhibits
these attributes, namely, normal. At this point the notion of normative judgments of
normality makes its appearance.
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Normative judgments of normality, thus, simply refer to people's judgments of
actions they internally experience or feel as normal, comfortable, and fitting. For
instance, people subjectively experience dancing to a well-known type of music as
normal, as matching the actions they usually carry out during dancing—in this case, a
sense of comfort accompanies the movements involved in dancing. Conversely, when
dancing to a unknown genre of music, these same people might subjectively experience
the new required set of movements as abnormal, as mismatching actions they usually
carry out—in this case, a sense of discomfort will follow. Statements such as "I just don't
feel right doing thaf
,
"doing that makes me feel uncomfortable", "that behavior just does
not fit me", "doing it just became natural", and "I am not being myself, are everyday
examples of the phenomenology ofjudgments of normality.
Normative judgments of morality, permissibility, commonality, and normality are
among some of the judgments social psychologists are interested in. In general, social
psychologists are primarily interested in whether certain types ofjudgments people make
in their everyday life covary with their behavior. The study of attitudes is a prime
example; social psychologists observe whether people's likes and dislikes covary with
their actions. Social psychologists also invest efforts in understanding the links that exist
among judgments—for example, whether normative judgments are related to each other
or to other variables. Indeed, they formulate theories that by their very nature describe
relationships among judgments and among judgments and behavior. The theory of
planned behavior (Ajzen, 1988) illustrates these two interests social psychologists have:
The theory postulates that three types ofjudgments—attitude, subjective norm, and
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perceived behavioral control judgments-directly covary with behavioral intention
judgments. Intention judgments in turn directly covary with behavior.
More specifically, the first type ofjudgment in the theory, attitude, refers to
people's judgments of whether they favor or oppose a particular course of action. This
variable focuses on the consequences of performing an action, specifically, on how the
consequences are evaluated and how likely they are to occur. Pleasant and likely
consequences strengthen people's attitudes to perform corresponding behaviors, whereas
unpleasant and unlikely outcomes do the opposite. For instance, the consequence of
cutting in line could be a cold stare, a reprimand, or a push. Presumably, people estimate
how likely and how desirable each of these consequences would be in forming their
attitudes toward this behavior. The second type judgment, subjective norms, represents
the interest focus of the present thesis. It reflects social pressures to conform to others'
prescriptions for behavior, particularly if the others are important. Subjective norms also
take into consideration people's own desires to act in agreement with important others'
prescriptions for behavior. The last type ofjudgment in the theory of planned behavior,
perceived behavioral control, refers to people's judgment ofhow difficult performing a
particular behavior would be.
These three judgments—attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral
control
—
jointly influence behavior through their effects on a fourth judgment, namely,
intentions. Intentions to carry out an action are then the closest judgment variable
determining behavior. For instance, given that one has a positive attitude toward being
late for a first date (attitude), one's friends think it is OK to be late for a first date
(subjective norms), and one feels that being late for a first date would be easy to do
(perceived behavioral control), an intention to be late for a first date would most likely
develop. This intention then would translate into the actual behavior, being late for a date.
To repeat, recasting the theory of planned behavior in terms ofjudgments equates to
saying that three types ofjudgments covary with a fourth type, and that this fourth
judgment covaries with behavior.
To bring things back into perspective, the focus of the present research is on the
normative component of the theory of planned behavior, subjective norms. This thesis
substitutes normative judgments for subjective norms on the ground that personal
considerations, such as attitudes, perceived behavioral control, and moral values, are
stronger influences than social pressures (i.e., subjective norms) for certain classes of
behavior (see Ajzen, 1991, for a review of 16 studies leading to this conclusion). A case
in point supporting the contention that knowing about people's personal considerations is
more important than being aware of social pressures is the concept of habit. It is habits'
private nature that agrees with the fundamental assumption of normative judgment theory
that prediction of behavior must begin in how the individual judges his or her actions, not
in how others judge the individual's actions. Although social pressures exist in the form
of expected or required courses of action, it is how the people under these pressures judge
the behaviors they are about to perform that ultimately matters. It is not so much what
others expect or require that matters, but how the people in question think—allowed,
moral, common, or normal—about the action. It follows that the meanings normative
judgments convey to people and impart to behavior are ultimately responsible for its
performance. This is in line with the assumption made by the theory of normative
judgments that behavior is best predicted when internal psychological forces stemming
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from dispositions, tendencies, or inclinations (such as normative judgments) are
considered first in any explanatory model. The fact that people regularly exercise
discretion or the freedom to judge and act on their own terms is the most important
support for and foundation on which the theory of normative judgments rests.
Although, everyday, all types of social influences undeniably exert their force on
people's thinking and behavior, it is undoubtedly these people's own personal judgments,
affected or unaffected by external social factors, that ultimately dictate the nature and
direction of their behavior. Normative judgments do just that, they inform the person of
the nature of the behavior he or she is about to engage in. They give behavior their
meaning, and it is this meaning that energizes and guides it. People can take into
consideration other people's desires, feelings, expectations, thoughts, or behavior when
formulating a decision to take a course of action, but their own psychological factors-
desires, feelings, etc.—are often what ultimately makes a difference in terms of choice of
behavior. Again, this is not to say that external social factors do not have an effect on
what people do, or else social psychology would not exist, but that given the great weight
placed on norms as social influence, this thesis is interested in the other side of the coin,
on people's normative judgments.
Evidence accumulated thus far in the attitude literature suggests that other
idiosyncratic and personal judgments, such as morally based ones, might add to the
predictive power of the normative component of the TPB, above and beyond subjective
norms (Boyd & Woadersman, 1991; Gorsuch & Ortberg, 1983; Harland, Staats, and
Wilke, 1999; Kurland, 1995; Parker, Manstead, & Stradling, 1995; Pagel & Davidson,
1984; Pomazal & Jaccard, 1976; Raats, Sheperd, & Sparks, 1995; Schwartz & Tesller,
1972; Zuckerman & Reis, 1978; ). This evidence additionally supports the contention that
subjective norms are the weakest predictor of behavior (Godin & Kok, 1996, Sheppard,
Harwick, & Warshaw, 1988; van den Putte, 1991). Indeed, at times subjective norms fail
to predict behavior altogether (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). For these three reasons, the present
study chose to focus on four personal judgments that might supplement and strengthen
the predictive power of the normative component of the TPB. Given that up to now only
normative judgments of morality have been properly examined, this study seeks to
explore three less well-understood normative judgments—permissibility, commonality,
and normality—and to further investigate normative judgments of morality.
C. Pilot Work
In a pilot study 60 UMASS undergraduate students judged one hundred and
fifteen behaviors. They classified these behaviors based on whether they performed them
(a) because of their own moral standards (corresponding to normative judgments of
morality), (b) because of rules and regulations imposed by societv (corresponding to
normative judgments of permissibility), (c) because they were customs, traditions, or
common practices (corresponding to normative judgments of commonality), or (d)
because people who are important to them believe they should (corresponding to
normative judgments of normality). The last type of normative explanation for behavior
does not seem to match its corresponding normative judgment of normality because the
pilot work was conducted with a different classification scheme in mind. Therefore, the
results concerning normative judgments of normality are tentative and thus must be
treated with care.
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Out of the hundred and fifteen behaviors, eight quahfied for the present study on
the basis of their high rankings (specifically their statistic mode) on only one of the four
ratings above. A listing of these eight behaviors follows:
Actions most often classified as influenced by moral standards:
1- Revealing the personal secrets of someone one knows to nthpr^
2- Exchanging numbers with someone at a p^rty even thouph one has a pirlfrienH
or bovfriend
.
Actions most often classified as governed by rules and regulations imposed by society:
1- Cutting in line at a theater restroom .
2. Being late for a date .
Actions most often classified as conforming to customs and common practices:
1- Eating cake using vour hands at a dinner partv .
2. Being late for a psvchologv class .
Actions most often classified as regulated by people who are deemed important:
1. Studying on a Saturday night .
2. Sitting in front of the class .
To reemphasize the rationale for choosing eight behaviors, the little knowledge
accumulated on the relationship between types of behaviors and normative judgments
justified the inclusion of two behaviors per normative judgment. The more behaviors
included, the better chance of revealing those behavioral features that might elicit
particular normative judgments, of increasing the internal validity of normative judgment
theory, and thus of extending the generalizability of the findings to other behaviors.
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D. Predictions
First, I expect that normative judgments of morality best predict intentions to
perform or not to perform those behaviors influenced by moral standards; judgments of
permissibility those actions governed by rules and regulations; normative judgments of
commonality those behaviors conforming to customs and common practices; and






One hundred and fifty students seeking to fulfill a course requirement participated
in a correlational study. Normadve judgments of morality, permissibility, commonality,
and normality, in addition to attitudes and perceived behavioral control, constituted the
predictor variables and intention the criterion variable. Randomly assigned participants






Eight behaviors featured in the present study: revealing the personal secrets of
someone one knows to others , exchanging numbers with someone at a party even though
one has a girlfriend or bovfriend
. cutdng in line , being late for a date , eating cake using
the hands
,
being late for class , studying on a Saturday night , and sitting in front of the
class
.
As previously pointed out, a pilot study indicated that the first two actions evoked
normative judgment of morality, the next two, normative judgment of permissibility, the
following two, normative judgment of commonality, and the last two, normative
judgment of normality. The contexts in which the behaviors occurred follows:
Situation 1 (The prediction is that normative judgments of morality would
account for intention to perform this behavior) . You find out that an
acquaintance of yours is dating a UMASS student you have recently met. This
13
student confided in you that he or she occasionally goes through severe bouts
of depression. You wonder whether to reveal this information to your
acquaintance.
The student is then asked to rate the behavior revealing the per.nn.i ....m
of the student to your acquaintance on a series of scales described below.
Situation 2 (The prediction i s that normative judgments of moralitv wnnlH
also account for intention to perform this behavior) You and your
boyfriend/girlfriend have been accepted to schools in separate states, however,
you two are still committed to the relationship. Two weeks into the semester
you go to a party. At this party you start conversing with someone you find
attractive. Towards the end of the party this person asks you to exchange
phone numbers
—
you hesitate to respond.
The student is then asked to rate the behavior exchanging numbers with
the person at the party .
Situation 3 (The prediction is that normative judgments of permissibilitv
would account for intention to perform this behavior) . At the local movie
theater, you are waiting in the restroom line to use one of the stalls. The line is
relatively long, and you casually notice that the two people in front of you are
furiously debating about the movie's theme. The next stall becomes free, but
these two don't notice. You are beginning to be tempted to cut in line.
The student is then asked to rate the behavior cutting in line .
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Situation 4 (The prediction is that normative
i
nHpn^ents of permi..ihii;ty
would also account for intention to perform thi. hph.v;..) You are single, and
you have just met someone special at UMASS. Naturally, a first official date
is planned.
The student is then asked to rate the behavior arriving late to the first date
Situation 5 (The prediction is that normative judgments of commonality
would account for intention to perform this heh;^vinr) You are taking a
psychology class that meets twice a week.
The student is then asked to rate the behavior arriving late to the
psvchologv class -
Situation 6 (The prediction is that normative judgments of commonality
would also account for intention to perform this behavior)
. You are invited to
an informal dinner party by a classmate. After eating the main course, cake is
served as dessert to everyone present.
The student is then asked to rate the behavior eating the cake using your
hands at the dinner party .
Situation 7 (The prediction is that normative judgments of normality would
account for intention to perform this behavior) . You are taking a full load of
classes, and your next exam is two weeks away. It is Saturday night, and you
don't have any plans.
The student is then asked to rate the behavior studying on this Saturday
night .
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" Situation 8 (The prediction is that normntive judgments of norm.litY wnnlH
also account for intention to perform this heh.vinr) You are taking a
psychology class that meets twice a week.
The student is then asked to rate the behavior sitting in front ofthpH.cc
1 Independent and Dependent Variables
To avoid redundancy, cutting in line will be used as an example of how the variables
in this study were measured
.
Five seven-point semantic-differential scales ending at bad-good
, unpleasant-
Eieasant, foolish-wise, useless-useful, and unattractive-attractive measured attitudes
towards cutting in line .
Three items measured perceived behavioral control of cutting in line: (1) "If I
wanted to, I could cut in line (ending at false-true)." (2) "I find cutting in line a difficult
thing to do (ending at false-true; this item was reverse scored)." (3) "Cutting in line
would take a great deal of effort on my part (ending at disagree-agree; this item was also
reverse scored)." Higher scores on these scales indicate greater perceived behavioral
control.
Four items assessed normafive judgment of morality, permissibility,
commonality, and normality: "I think that cutting in line would be an action that is
(ending at morally right-morally wrong for morality, allowed-not allowed for
permissibility, common-uncommon for commonality, and typical of me-not typical of me
for normality)". These four items were reverse-scored so that higher numbers represent
the positive end of the normafive judgments.
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Finally, three items tapped into intentions to cut in line: (1) "I would cut in line
(ending at unlikely-likely)." (2) "If the opportunity came, I would be willing to cut in line
(ending at disagree-agree)." (3) "If I had to choose between what to do and what not to
do, I would choose to cut in line (ending at disagree-agree)." Higher scores on these
scales suggest stronger behavioral intentions.
In sum, each of eight questionnaires assessed attitudes, perceived behavioral
control, four normative judgments, and behavioral intentions.
To avoid response bias, participants responded to random configurations of all
items except the semantic-differential scales measuring attitudes. To prevent order
effects, students filled out sets of counterbalanced questionnaires.
C. Procedure
The questionnaires were administered to groups raging from 2 to 7 students.
Participants came to the laboratory to participate in a study interested in "things students
do at UMASS". Participants first read and signed on informed consent forms, then read
the instructions to the questionnaire and completed it. Upon finishing filling out the





A preliminary analysis assessed the internal consistency of attitude, perceived
behavioral control, and intention scales. It resulted in the deletion of one of the perceived
behavioral control items- "if I wanted to I could..."- from every situation. After
removing this item, alpha coefficients indicated good internal consistencies for all three
variables in all eight situations, as shown in Tables 1- 4. Subsequently, mean indices were
computed by averaging across each set of item scores representing attitude, perceived
behavioral control, and intention. Thus, high values indicate more favorable attitude,
greater perceived behavioral control, and stronger intention.
Upon establishing internal consistency and computing indices, I examined the
standard deviations of attitude, perceived behavioral control, morality, permissibility,
commonality, normality, and intention for every situation. I did this to reach a better
interpretation of the regression coefficients given that I am dealing with ratios of
dependent to independent variables. Small standard deviations in intentions would have
the effect of increasing the value of all 6 independent variable coefficients within a given
situation making some regression coefficients look more influential than they really are.
Small standard deviations would also mean small sum of squares total. This in turn would
also help the regression coefficients achieve significance because of the decrease in the
size of the standard error of the estimate due to a decrease in the sum of squares due to
error. Conversely, larger standard deviations in intentions than in attitudes, perceived
behavioral control, morality, permissibility, commonality, and normality would lead to
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smaller regression coefficients (i.e. it would flatten out their slopes). Inspection of Table
5 indicates that situation 4 has the smallest standard deviation in intention scores (SD =
1
.09), situation 5, 6 and 8 contain medium standard deviations in intention (SD = 1
.46,
1
.49, and 1 .69, respectively), and situation 1 , 2, 3, and 7 have the largest standard
deviation in intentions (SD = 1.83, 2.02, 1.96, and 1.91, respectively).
Next, I assessed the tolerance level of all 6 independent variables in all eight
situations. I found the tolerances to be satisfactory, as demonstrated in Table 6-9. Of all
indicators, this is the most important one, because it reflects not only the size of the
standard error of the regression coefficients but also the variance-covariance matrix of the
coefficients. Low levels of tolerance indicate high correlations between independent
variables. If high correlations it would mean two things. First, the constructs of interest
are overlapping in meaning; that is, they do not discriminate between each other.
Overlapping constructs signify that the same question is being asked with different
words. In the present case, the constructs of interests are normative judgments. Second,
low levels of tolerance would indicate that the matrix (X'X)"', (that is, the variance-
covariance matrix of factors or the matrix of correlations, whichever is being used) is
singular or approach singularity. A singular matrix, in turn, would make it impossible to
arrive at the equation B = (X'X)"'X'Y and, therefore, to solve for the matrix of regression
coefficients B. In addition, low tolerances would indicate unstable standard errors of
regression coefficients that, in turn, would complicate the interpretation of these
coefficients. In short, the stability of the regression coefficients will be in question
because multiple solutions for their regression equations will be likely; without stable
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coefncents. little can be said of the relationship between normative judgments and
behavioral intentions.
Unfortunately, examination of tolerances revealed high levels of this indicator for
normative judgments of normality in all eight situations. The remaining three normative
judgments reflected distinct psychological entities. The significance of this event is that
although normative judgments of normality predict behavioral intention quite well, it is
not necessary after considering the remaining three normative judgments. Given that
normative judgments of morality, permissibility, and commonality readily predict
normative judgments of normality, the latter must be close to a linear combination of the
former. Being a linear combination of morality, permissibility, and commonality would
mean that normative judgments of normality represents a dependent vector in the matrix
of independent variables X, and that after solving for (X'X) '
,
it would yield closely
infinite number of solutions. Since this appears to be the case, normative judgment of
normality regression coefficients are not trustworthy. A second problem with this
normative judgment is that it is so highly correlated with intention that it is difficult to
empirically separate the two. Thus, two separate regression analyses were conducted: one
with normafive judgments of normality included and one with it excluded.
B. Rationale for the Analvses and Restatement of Hypotheses
Building on the framework of the theory of planned behavior it was predicted that,
in conjunction with attitudes and perceived behavioral control, only one type of
normative judgment should best predict intention to perform a given class of behavior.
Hierarchical regression analysis is the appropriate statistical tool to test this hypothesis.
Data were, consequently, submitted to hierarchical regression analyses in which
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behavioral intentions acted as the criterion variable and attitudes, perceived behavioral
control, morality, permissibility, commonality, and normality the predictor variables.
These six independent variables entered the regression model in the following order:
Situation 1 and 2 in which revealing the personal secrets of .nmeone one know,
toothers and exchanging numbers with .someone at a nartv even though one ha. .
girlfriend or boyfriend are the behaviors of interest
. I predicted that normative judgments
of morality should be the strongest significam predictor. In line with the theory of
planned behavior's traditional way of entering its constructs into hierarchical regression
models, attitudes and normative judgment of morality came first in step 1. Step 2
consisted of perceived behavioral control. Lastly, step 3 included permissibility,
commonality, and normality.
Situation 3 and 4 in which cutting in line and being late for a date are the
behaviors of interest. I further predicted that normative judgments of permissibility
should be able to predict intentions the best. As such, attitudes and normative judgment
of permissibility entered in step 1. Step 2 included perceived behavioral control, and step
3 morality, commonality, and normality.
Situation 5 and 6 in which eating cake using the hands and being late for class are
the behaviors of interest
. I predicted for these two situations that normative judgments of
commonality should have the strongest influence on intentions. Consistent with situation
1-4, attitudes and normative judgment of commonality came in step 1. Step 2 consisted of
perceived behavioral control, and step 3 included morality, permissibility, and normality.
Situation 7 and 8 in which studying on a Saturdav night and sitting in front of the
class are the behaviors of interest . Finally, I predicted that normative judgment of
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normality should be most strongly related to behavioral intentions. Thus, attitudes and
normative judgment of normality took first place in step 1. Step 2 represented perceived
behavioral control, and step 3 morality, permissibility, and commonality.
C. Findings in which normative judgments of normality were inrluHpH
Two major points emerged from the present results. First, normative judgments of
morality, permissibility, commonality, and normality when accompanied by attitude and
perceived behavioral control seemed to do a good job at predicting behavioral intentions.
This limited model confirmed seven of the eight hypotheses of interest. For instance, the
model demonstrated that intentions to cut in line and to arrive late to a first date depend
on normative judgments of permissibility. However, once the remaining normative
judgments were added to the limited model, more than one normative judgment predicted
behavioral intentions. Therefore, the data did not completely support the expected
covariation between specific normative judgments and given types of behavior. Second,
the operadonalizafion of normative judgments of normality proved to be inadequate. This
finding obtain support from the observation that normative judgments of normality highly
correlated with intentions and the other remaining normative judgments.
The idea of presenting two sets of hierarchical regression models given the
suspicious nature of normative judgments of normality was further supported by the
results. Normadve judgments of normality (i.e., how typical a behavior is for a person)
highly predicted behavioral intentions in all eight situations, its regression coefficients
ranging from a low .31 to a high .62. Nevertheless, this high predictability is questionable
on the grounds of poor tolerance levels and high normality-behavioral intentions
correlations. It seems that normative judgments of normality overlap not only with
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normative judgments of morality, permissibility, and commonality but also with
behavioral intentions. This overlap means that morality, permissibility, and commonality
capably predicts both normality and behavioral intentions. Hence, the operationalization
of normality seems to be semantically similar to that of behavioral intentions, rendering
the two constructs hardly distinguishable. Not surprisingly, an overall look at the results
indicated support only for the hypotheses pertaining to normative judgments of
normality.
As Tables 6-9 indicate, out of all the normative judgments, normality seemed to
account for the most variance in intentions to perform every one of the behaviors of
interest. Furthermore, although judgments of morality, permissibility, and commonality
did influence intentions to perform various behaviors, in none of the eight situations did
they predict behavioral intentions as strongly as normality. These results at first look
suggest that a linear relationship between normative judgments of normality and
behavioral intentions exists—such that the more typical people judge the behaviors in this
study to be, the stronger their intentions to perform these behaviors are—however, this
conclusion is misleading. To restate the position taken at this section's outset, a more
plausible interpretation of the findings is that the operationalizations of normality and
behavioral intentions are highly related, to the point of making the two constructs almost
indistinguishable. A detailed report of the overall results follows.
The hypothesis that normative judgments of morality should best account for
variance in intentions to reveal the personal secrets of a student to others and in intentions
to exchange numbers with someone at a party even though they are in a committed
relationship were not supported. Attitude and judgments of morality did seem useful in
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predicting intentions to reveal a student's personal secret to others (58% of the explained
variance) and to exchange numbers at a party regardless of being committed in a
relationship (56% of the explained variance), they were not the only normative judgments
accounting for variability m behavioral intentions. As seen in Table 6, permissibility (i.e.
judgments regarding what is allowed) and normality (i.e. judgments concerning what
feels normal to do) also accounted for substantial amounts of variance in intentions (19
%, situation 1 and 12%, situation 2) in situation 1, 19%, F (1, 223) = 63.43, p < .05, and
situation 2, 12%, F (1, 224) = 36.36, p < .05. Moreover, normality's significant
regression coefficients of .61, in the case of revealing the personal secrets of a student to
others, and
.45, when it comes to exchanging numbers with someone at a party, clearly
show a stronger relationship between this construct and intentions than morality's weak
significant and non-significant coefficients (.12 and .02, respectively). This means that
for every unit change in people's judgments ofhow normal the preceding two behaviors
are there is a corresponding change of .61 and .45 units in behavioral intentions,
compared to morality's change of .12 and .02. It seems that people's judgments of not
only how moral but also of how allowed, common, and normal revealing a student's
personal secrets and exchanging numbers at a party are important in predicting these
behaviors. Moreover, normality predicts behavior better than morality. In short, the more
moral, allowed, normal, and common revealing a student's personal secrets and
exchanging numbers at a party are judged to be, the stronger the intention to perform
these behaviors.
The construct permissibility should be the normative judgment most able to
explain the amount of variability in intentions to cut in line and to be late for a first date.
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These hypotheses were also not supported by the data. Table 7 shows that ahhough the
coefficients for permissibiHty were significant in the case of cutting in line, b =
.34, t
(224) = 3.9, p < .05, and being late for a date, b =
.17, t (223) = 4.3, p < .05, suggesting a
relationship between this variable and intentions, other normative judgments also
accounted for variability in behavioral intentions. Specifically, while attitudes and
permissibility accounted for 55% of variance in intentions to cut in line, normality, h =
.62, t (224) = 10.80, p < .05, was also able to account for 14% of variance, F (1, 224) =
40.17, p < .05. With respect to intentions to be late for a date, attitudes and permissibility
accounted for 27% of its variance, while morality,
_b = -.12, t (223) = -2.4, p < .05,
commonality, b = .08, t (223) = 2.7, p < .05, and permissibility, b = .3 1, t (223) = 8.4, p <
.05, accounted for 21%, F (1 , 223) = 63.43, p < .05. What this means is that the more
people viewed the behaviors cutting in line and arriving late to a first date as being
allowed, the more they intend to perform these two actions, but people's intentions are
also influenced by how moral, common, and, especially, how normal cutting in line and
arriving late to a first date are believed to be.
Only the normative judgment of commonality should best account for variability
in intentions to arrive late to a psychology class and to eat cake using the hands at a
dinner party. The other three normative judgments should weakly predict intentions to
carry out these behaviors. This hypothesis was not supported by the data. As indicated in
Table 8, commonality's regression coefficients were significant in both cases, arriving
late to a psychology class, b = .20, t (222) = 4.7, p < .05, and eating cake using one's
hands at a dinner party _b = .41, t (224) = 8.8, p < .05, indicating a linear relationship
between this normative judgment and intentions. Together with attitudes this construct
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accounted for 21% of variance in intentions to arrive late to psychology class and 59% in
intentions to eat cake using one's hands at a dinner party. However, morality, b = -16, t
(222) = -2.2, p < .05, commonality, b = .09, t (222) = 2.1, p < .05, and normality,
_b = .36,
t (222) = 7.4, p < .05, were also able to account for 13% of the variability in intentions to
arrive late to a psychology class, F (1, 222) = 21.10, p < .05; and normality, b =
.42, t
(224) = 7.9, p < .05, accounted for 6% of the variability in intentions to arrive late to a
first date, F (1, 224) = 21 .33, p < .05. In conclusion, prediction of intentions to arrive late
to a psychology class and to eat cake using one's hands at a dinner party from knowing
how common these behaviors are thought to be is possible, but other types of normative
judgments should also be taken into account, notably, normative judgments of normality.
Finally, only normative judgments of normality should best account for variance
in intentions to study on a Saturday night and to sit in front of the class. These were the
only set of hypotheses supported by the data. Table 9 shows that , in conjunction with
attitudes, normative judgments of normality accounted for 66% of variance in intentions
to study on a Saturday night and 77% of variance in intentions to sit in front of the class.
Only normality's regression coefficients were significant in both cases, studying on a
Saturday night, b = .59, t (224) = 10.12, p < .05, and sitting in front of the class, b = .50, t
(224) = 12.9, p < .05, indicating that knowing how normal people feel about studying on
a Saturday night and sitting in front of the class is enough to predict their intentions to
perform these two behaviors.
D. Findings in which normative judgments of normality were excluded
Since normative judgments of normality overlapped with both the criterion
variable and other predictors, this variable might have suppressed or veiled the effect of
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all other normative judgments on behavioral intentions. Therefore, the construction of a
model containmg only normative judgments of morality, permissibility, and commonality
served to assess the impact of normative judgments of normality on the present study.
Three important findings arose from this modified model. First, revealing the
personal secrets of an acquaintance to a friend was the only behavior guided by more than
one normative judgment (morality, permissibility, and commonality). The rest of the
behaviors depended exclusively on either normative judgment of permissibility or
commonality. In fact, commonality single-handedly accounted for variance in intentions
to carry out five of the behaviors—one behavior expected to be influenced by
permissibility, two by commonality, and two by normality. More specifically, people's
perceptions of how common or uncommon the behaviors arriving late to a first date,
eating cake with the hands, arriving late to a psychology class, studying on a Saturday
night, and sitting in front of the class independently determined their intentions to engage
in these actions. In comparison, normafive judgments of permissibility by themselves
explained variability in intentions to perform only two behaviors: exchanging numbers
with someone at a party even though one is in a committed relafionship (a behavior
previously expected to be influenced by normative judgments of morality) and cutting in
line.
The second finding of interest in the present study is that even though
permissibility and commonality independently impacted seven of the eight behaviors, the
increases in the amount of variance accounted for by these two normative judgments were
negligible—between 2% and 5 % increase (12% in only one case: arriving late to a first
date). This indicates that the additive benefit of permissibility and commonality is
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minimal compared with the effects of the original normative judgments. That is, the
model consisting of attitude, perceived behavioral control, and a normative judgment
(i.e., target predictor) benefits little or none from the addition of the remaining normative
judgments.
Third, even though normative judgments of morality have successfully predicted a
wide variety of behaviors in the past, it was able to predict only one behavior in the
present study. In fact, morality at first sight appeared to be negatively related to behaviors
that were not expected to relate to this judgment at all, such as arriving late to a date and
arriving late to a psychology class. However this anomaly is due to a spurious
relationship, one created by a negatively skewed distribution for morality and a positively
skewed distribution for behavioral intentions. The nature of the morality score
distribution arose out of a restricted range extending from 1 = morally wrong through 4 =
does not apply in which most people chose a four. Therefore, most people viewed





The most important insights gained from the present study are threefold. First, in
conjunction with attitudes and perceived behavioral control, all normative judgments
seem to do an OK job at predicting behavioral intentions once normative judgments of
normality were taken out of the model. The assumption that each normative judgment
should best predict behavior of a particular kind and, consequently, predict poorly
behavior of a different kind, received preliminary empirical support only for one of the
target behaviors. That is, normative judgments of morality, permissibility, and
commonality predicted well only one of its two corresponding behaviors. This support
took the form of high regression coefficients and good levels of explained variance for
those normative judgments expected to account for variability in target behavioral
intention. Further support included insignificant amounts of explained variance accounted
by those extra normative judgments not expected to contribute much to the prediction of
intentions. Once the normative judgment of interest entered the model, the rest of the
normative judgments offered little or no help in accounting for the left-over unexplained
variability in intentions (see Tables 10-13).
Second, care must be taken when operationalizing normative judgments of
normality such that this construct does not overlap with behavioral intentions. Here the
advice is to use the bipolar adjective normal/abnormal, comfortable/uncomfortable, or
fitting/unfitting when operationalizing the construct. One example bearing on this
suggestion is to ask subjects whether performing a particular behavior feels normal or
abnormal to them.
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Third and the most important of all the findings obtained in the present study is
that not all judgments covary with all types of behaviors. There seems to be a one-to-one
privileged relationship between certain kinds of normative judgments and specific classes
of behavioral intenUons. For instance, normative judgments of morality predicted well
only those behaviors identified in a pilot study as having something to do with moral
standards. However, when it came to customary, everyday behaviors, such as eating cake
using one's hands, most people reported that morality just did not apply to these types of
behaviors. In other words, morality did not at all play a role in the judging of certain
types of actions. In contrast, the normative judgments that would most reasonably seem
to predict customary behavior, commonality, predicted well these simple behaviors.
The above observations might come as no surprise, but their implicadons are not
trivial for the science of psychology. They suggest that one of the principal tasks of social
psychologists is to discover what it is about particular behaviors that is responsible for
creating one-to-one relationships between these actions and a given class ofjudgments.
This would mean more time spent on the identification, description, cataloguing, and
organization of clusters of behavioral features believed to correspond to the evocation of
specific judgments. Obviously this task is not a simple one, for it would be equivalent to
any other grand classificatory endeavor, such as the periodic table of the elements in
chemistry, classification of atomic particles in physics, and the taxonomy of life in
biology. Nevertheless, in the long run, the identification and classification of those
features of action underlying certain behavior-judgment covariations could prove
priceless to researchers and theorists alike.
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In the same vein, classificatory systems ofjudgments would help researchers
better understand various psychological relationships. As this study demonstrates,
psychological constructs, at first look, appear rather simple, unitary, abstract entities, but
upon closer inspection their multifaceted nature reveals itself. Even something as
widespread, well known, and ubiquitous in social psychology as norms readily breaks
down into a multitude of normative judgments, each responsible for influencing certain
classes of actions. This suggests that perhaps most psychological variables exist in
hierarchical webs consisting of general to specific concepts (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), and
that the use of any one construct should be carried out after arriving at a careful
understanding of where that concept fits in its conceptual web. It could be the case that
normative judgments exist as derivations of more general constructs (i.e., higher order),
such as subjective norms, and, therefore, that predicting behavior from normative
judgments versus more general concepts would drastically lead to very different results.
Taken together, the last two paragraphs contain speculations analogous to the
principle of compatibility advanced in the area of attitudes stating that strong judgment-
behavior correlation is best obtained when the two, judgment and behavior, match with
respect to a number of features (e.g., context, time, etc.; Ajzen, 1985). In the same
manner, bringing together the idea of an exhaustive classificatory system involving
behavioral attributes and the notion of a general-to-specific web of concepts would help
identify compatible one-to-one relationships between distinct types ofjudgments and
classes of behavior. For instance, according to the present study, the performance of the
behavior revealing the personal secrets of an acquaintance to someone you know depends
on how moral or immoral this action is perceived to be. This one-to-one relationship must
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be a by-product of the place held by normative judgment of morality in a general-to-
specific conceptual web together with those aspects of this behavior responsible for the
strength of the judgment-behavior bond. If a construct higher in the conceptual scheme
were applied to the same behavior, perhaps fewer or greater number of behavioral
attributes would have to be taken into consideration than when a more concrete normative
construct, such as morality, was the object of study. In sum, a different principle of
compatibility would stress the importance of both, the characteristics of the behavior and
the conceptual nature of the psychological variable in question.
Furthermore, it is highly probable that constructs high in the conceptual web
become more abstract and harder to verbalize resulting in almost preconscious
application of these constructs to their objects. This would mean that because concepts
lower in the web are more concrete, clearer in consciousness and, thus, easily expressed,
selecting them when using subjects' conscious self-reports as means to collecting data
would provide more accurate information. This might be the reason morality predicted
only one behavior in this study, and, even then, two other normative judgments
accompanied it in its prediction. Morality is one of those concepts that everyone knows
what it is when they see it, but no one knows what it means when they are asked.
Permissibility, comparatively, predicted a wider range of behaviors, including one of the
actions that morality was supposed to predict, perhaps because people have less trouble
grasping its meaning or because they use this concept more often in their everyday life.
Commonality, likewise, seems to be a well-understood, readily accessible construct.
Thus, given that some normative judgments may reside lower in the conceptual web (i.e.,
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they are more concrete) than other normative constructs, they Hkely provide richer and
more accurate information.
This thesis hopefully lays the groundwork for a different way of conceptualizing
the norm construct. Although the ideas contain seem counterintuitive to everyday ways of
thinking about norms, they represent just another piece in the normative puzzle. Taken
together with other examined aspects of norms, such as interpersonal perceptions
(descriptive and injunctive norms), specific rules and regulations (personal norms), and
unconscious processes (habits), normative judgments could add a valuable missing link to
the understanding of the relationship between norms and behavior.
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Table 1
Reliabilities and Intercorrelations Among Intention, Normative Judgments of Morality,
Permissibility, Commonality, and Normality, Attitude, and Perceived Behavioral Control
(PBC): Situation 1 (n = 230 ) and 2 (n = 231)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

























3. Permissibility .55 .47
4. Commonality .47 .27 .45
5. Normality .79 .39 .45 .43
6. Attitude .74 .52 .48 .48 .58 .87
7. PBC .68 .43 .47 .41 .66 .32 .85
Note. All correlation coefficients are significant at the .05 level.
Bold numbers represent alpha coefficient levels (i.e., internal consistency).
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Table 2
Reliabilities and Intercoirelations Among Intention, Normative Judgments of Morality,
Permissibility, Commonality, and Normality, Attitude, and Perceived Behavioral Control
(PBC): Situation 3 (n = 231) and 4 (n = 230)














.84 .46 .63 .37
6. Attitude
.69 .42 .58 .35 .68 .86
7. PBC
.62 .32 .48 .46 .60 .49 .84






3. Permissibility .42 .38
4. Commonality .53 .23 .44
5. Normality .70 .19 .34 .55
6. Attitude .47 .36 .44 .32 .36 .87
7. PBC .51 .21 .39 .44 .64 .33
Note. All correlation coefficients are significant at the .05 level.
Bold numbers represent alpha coefficient levels (i.e., internal consistency).
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Table 3
Reliabilities and Intercorrelations Among Intention, Normative Judgments of Morality,
Permissibility, Commonality, and Normality, Attitude, and Perceived Behavioral Control


































3. Permissibility .62 .45
4. Commonality .68 .29 .68
5. Normality .80 .33 .63 .64
6. Attitude .67 .47 .64 .55 .67 .88
7. PBC .70 .43 .62 .56 .68 .61
Note. All correlation coefficients are significant at the .05 level.
Bold numbers represent alpha coefficient levels (i.e., internal consistency).
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Table 4
Reliabilities and Intercorrelations Among Intention, Normative Judgments of Morality,
Permissibility, Commonality, and Normality, Attitude, and Perceived Behavioral Control
(PBC)
:
Situations 7 (n = 23 1 ) and 8 (n = 23 1
)
Variables 12 3

















.57 .26 .35 .37 .46
7. PBC
.60 .11 .37 .38 .63





3. Permissibility .28 .23
4. Commonality .39 .08 .30
5. Normality .86 .22 .17 .35
6. Attitude .73 .33 .34 .35 .71 .83
7. PBC .67 .11 .28 .35 .64 .58
Note. All correlation coefficients are significant at the .05 level.


























bo k) On o
OO \D OO OO 0^ to bo
LtJ Ui to L.J 4^
ON to bo to




OO bo 4^ b
hO to to
o to bo
bo o • .
KJ L.J to to
Oi bo 0\




On ON On to »—
'
K) 4:^ to
'o\ k) to 00
bo bo ON to
ON 4^









































Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Behavioral
Intentions: Situation 1 (n = 230 ) and 2 (n = 231)
Revealing the personal secrets Exchanging numbers with
of a student to others someone at a party
Variable
Step 1

















.73 .47 .08 .08
.71
PBC .38 .15*




Attitude .71 .29* .07 .50 .74 .52* .07 .48
Mor .60 .12* .04
.61 .47 .02 .06 .65
PBC .38 -.02 .04 .75 .68 .13* .05 .48
Per .63 .09* .04 .50 .55 .12* .04 .62
Com .47 .03 .04 .68 .47 .01 .04 .69
Norm .85 .61* .50 .42 .79 .45* .05 .76** .49
Note
.
r = correlation coefficient; b = estimated unstandardized regression coefficient;
SE(b) = estimated standard error of regression coefficients; R^ = Squared multiple
correlation coefficient. *p < .05. **significant change in R^, p < .05.
Note. Mor = morality; Perm = permissibility; Com = commonality; Norm = normality
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Table 7
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Behavioral
Intentions: Situation 3 (n = 231) and 4 (n = 230)
S ^" line Arriving late to a first date
Step 1



























Attitude .69 .28* .18 .49 .47 .23* .05
.72
Perm .62 .08 .07 .49 .42 .07* .03
.65
PBC .62 .15* .05 .56 .51 .01 .03 .55
Mor .44 .02 .06 .69 .14 -.12* .05
.81
Com .35 -.04 .04 .75 .53 .08* .03 .62
Norm .84 .62* .06 .75** .39 .70 .31* .04 .59** .49
Note
.
r = correlation coefficient; b = estimated unstandardized regression coefficient;
SE(b) = estimated standard error of regression coefficients; R^ = Squared multiple
correlation coefficient. *p < .05. **significant change in R^, p < .05.
Note. Mor = morality; Perm = permissibility; Com = commonality; Norm = normality
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Table 8
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Behavioral
Intentions: Situation 5 (n = 229) and 6 (n = 231)
Arriving late to a psychology class Eating cake using one's hands
at a dinner party
Variable
oiep 1
r b SE(b) lol r b SE(b) r2 lol






.J J A A
.04 .21 .94 .68 .41*
.05 .59 .70
oiep z













.83 .70 .24* .04 .65**
.56
Step 3
Attitude .37 .16 .08
.77 .67 .17* .07
.43
Com .35 .04 .04
.76 .68 .21* .05 .46
PBC .52 .15* .04 .63 .70 .12* .04 .44
Mor .01 -.16* .07 .91 .40 .07 .05
.71
Perm .30 .09* .04 .73 .62 -.03 .05 .40
Norm .64 .36* .05 .49** .61 .80 .42* .05 .73** .38
Note
.
r = correlation coefficient; b = estimated unstandardized regression coefficient;
SE(b) = estimated standard error of regression coefficients; = Squared multiple
correlation coefficient. *p < .05. **significant change in R^, g < .05.
Note. Mor = morality; Perm = permissibility; Com = commonality; Norm = normality
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Table 9
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Behavioral
Intentions: Situations 7 (n = 23 1) and 8 (n = 23 1)
Studying on a Saturday night Sitting in front of the class
Variable
Step 1
r b SE(b) Id r b SE(b) R: lol
Attitude .57 .44*
.07 78























A 4-4-1 4--. - ^ ^Attitude .57 .36*
.08
.66 .73 .22* .06
.41
Norm .77 .59* .06
.48 .86 .50* .04 .40
PBC .60 .11 .07
.52 .67 .14* .04 .53
Mor .20 -.02 .06 .90 .23 .00 .04 .86
Perm .31 .06 .05 .81 .28 .08 .04 .80
Com .49 .08 .06 .66 .70 .39 .03 .03 .79 .80
Note
.
r = correlation coefficient; b = estimated unstandardized regression coefficient;
SE(b) = estimated standard error of regression coefficients; = Squared multiple
correlation coefficient. *p < .05. **significant change in R^, ^ < 05.
Note. Mor = morality; Perm = permissibility; Com = commonality; Norm = normality
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Table 10
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Behavioral
Intentions Excluding Normative Judgments of Normality: Situation 1 (n = 230 ) and
2(n = 231)
Revealing the personal secrets Exchanging numbers with
of a student to others someone at a party
Variable
oiep 1



















.73 .47 .08 .08
.71
PBC .38 .15* .05 .60**
.88 .68 .38* .05 .65**
.64
Step 3
Attitude .71 .60* .08 .60 .74 .69* .08
.51
Mor .60 .25* .05
.65 .47 .02 .08 .65
PBC .38 .06 .05 .77 .68 .33* .05 .60
Perm .63 .17* .06 .51 .55 .16* .05 .63
Com .47 .13* .05 .64** .72 .47 .05 .05 .67** .70
Note . r = correlation coefficient; b = estimated unstandardized regression coefficient;
SE(b) = estimated standard error of regression coefficients; R_ = Squared multiple
correlation coefficient. *p < .05. **significant change in R^, 2 < 05.




Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Behavioral
Intentions Excluding Normative Judgments of Normality: Situation 3 (n = 231) and
4 (n = 230)
Cutting in line Arriving late to a first date













.60 .47 .28* .06
Perm
.62 .25* .06





PBC .62 .31* .05 .61** .70 .51 .20* .03 .34** .82
Step 3
Attitude .69 .60* .08 .59 .47 .29* .06 .73
Perm .62 .22* .06 .52 .42 .06 .04 .65
PBC .62 .31* .05 .63 .51 .15* .03 .74
Mor .44 .10 .07 .70 .14 -.13* .06 .81
Com .35 -.02 .05 .62** .75 .53 .18* .03 .46** .71
Note . r correlation coefficient; b = estimated unstandardized regression coefficient;
SE(b) = estimated standard error of regression coefficients; R_ = Squared multiple
correlation coefficient. *p < .05. **significant change in R_, p < .05.
Note. Mor = morality; Perm = permissibility; Com = commonality; Norm = normality
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Table 12
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Behavioral
Intentions Excluding Normative Judgments of Normality: Situation 5 (n = 229) and
6(n = 231)
Arriving late to a psychology class Eating cake using one's hands
at a dinner party
Variable
Step 1
r b SE{b) Id r b SE(b) lol
Attitude .37 .46*
.09
.94 .67 .56* 07
. /u
Com .35 .20*














.83 .70 .24* .04 .65** .56
Step 3
Attitude .37 .30* .09 .81 .67 .35* .07 .43
Com .35 .11* .04
.80 .68 .31* .05 .46
PBC .52 .30* .04 .81 .70 .23* .04 .44
Mor .01 -.20* .08 .91 .40 .04 .05 .71
Perm .30 .06 .05 .36** .74 .62 .06 .05 .65 .40
Note . r = correlation coefficient; b = estimated unstandardized regression coefficient;
SE(b) = estimated standard error of regression coefficients; = Squared multiple
correlation coefficient. *p < .05. **significant change in R^, p < .05.
Note. Mor = morality; Perm = permissibility; Com = commonality; Norm = normality
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Table 13
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Mchavioral
Intentions Excluding Normative Judgments of Normality: Situations 7 (n ^11) and
8(n = 231)
Studying on a Saturday night Sitting in from of the class
Variable
step 1









.05 .66 .78 .86 .55*
.04 .77 .50
Step 2

















.68 .73 .64* .06
.41




Mor .20 .06 .07
.91 .23 .04 .04
.86
Perm .31 .03 .06 .81 .28 -.02 .04 .80
Com .49 .28* .07 .51** .80 .39 .04* .03 .63** .80
Note
.
r = correlation coefficient; b estimated unstandardized regression coerilcient;
SE(b) = estimated standard error of regression coefficients; = Squared multiple
correlation coefficient. *p < .05. **significant change in R^, JQ < .05.
Note. Mor = morality; Perm = permissibility; Com = commonality; Norm Normality
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